A Biartisan Solution to a Socialist Qualm: Unpacking Instinct in Cohen’s Camping Trip

In Why Not Socialism?, Cohen argues for a particular brand of socialism as a necessary reaction to two moral principles that he believes we implicitly recognize as dysfunctional within a capitalist system. I will argue that a simpler solution is possible. In section one, I will outline the relevant details of Cohen’s example case and how it relates to his argument. In section two, I will sketch my alternative interpretation of Cohen’s observations. In section three, I will offer the solution that follows from my interpretation and address two objections to my argument. Ultimately, I will show that Cohen’s socialist overhaul solution to our implicit disapproval of the camping example does not follow because (1) he is wrong about the source of that disapproval and (2) a simpler solution is justifiable within our existing capitalist economy.

I. Cohen’s Camping Trip and Appeal to Instinct

Cohen’s (2009)[1] argument favoring a form of socialism is strongly motivated by his sketch of a few seemingly perverse adjustments to an imagined camping trip. The camping trip he describes reads as the sort of Rockwellian, prototypically-1950s-American romp that he might have seen on the cover of Boys’ Life magazine as a young adult. Of relevance to Cohen and to us is the communal nature of that idealized trip: shared resources, no privately restricted property, and the spirit of camaraderie that such a venture seems to elicit and demand. From this baseline, Cohen invites us to reflect on the impact of individual campers diverging from the communal ideal and embracing essentially capitalist behavior instead. The example I will co-opt for my argument is that of a camper named Morgan, who claims private property rights over the nearby fishpond and its stock on the grounds that it was constructed and passed down by their father. “Great. Now I can have better food than you guys have,” Morgan proclaims to the apparent disgust of the other campers (Cohen, 2009, p. 9).

Cohen (2009) motivates his argument with the assumption that we, like the other campers, will find something instinctively unsavory about Morgan’s decision to retain exclusive ownership and use of the newly inherited fishpond and its resources. This presumed instinctive response, Cohen argues, reinforces his sense that “most people are drawn to the socialist ideal” of the collectively, versus capitalistically, organized camping trip (p. 6). Cohen believes that our instinctive queasiness is best understood as a sense of injustice stemming from two observations: (1) that Morgan did nothing to earn the fishpond but claims it only as an inherited birthright, and (2) this unjustly formed inequality damages the campers’ sense of community. Cohen parlays that sense into an argument for socialist reformation, arguing that such reformation is necessary to preserve the principles of equality and community with which we appear to sympathize implicitly. Since Cohen’s argument is motivated by—if not founded on—an appeal to this instinctive reaction to Morgan’s claim and behavior, I will build my reply from the same footing (Cohen, 2009).

II. Isolating the Stink in the Instinct

On first reading, I generally agreed with Cohen (2009): hoarding the fishpond and its resources in the context of the camping trip made Morgan seem like a “shmuck,” to use one of Cohen’s descriptors (p. 7). However, my consonance with Cohen diminishes after I consider why I instinctively feel that way about Morgan’s behavior. My reaction seems rooted in the assumption implied by Cohen that these campers are relying on the natural resources around them for food—presumably fishing and foraging. At most, maybe they are trapping small game, but that seems like a stretch for the prototypical trip that Cohen describes (it is not a hunting trip, after all). As such, it reasons that the fishpond’s stock is one of only a few limited resources keeping the campers nourished. By elaborating on my understanding of these conditions, I can more clearly see that my instinctively adverse reaction to Morgan’s claim is not driven by a sense of birthright inequality, as Cohen argues, but by a sense that Morgan’s claim violates—or gives the appearance of violating—the Lockean proviso.

The Lockean proviso alleges that property rights in a resource are only justifiable if there remains “enough and as good left in common for others” after the claim is made (Nozick, 1974, p. 175). Penner and Otsuka (2018) argue for the slightly more nuanced, but arguably still Lockean, interpretation that “‘enough, and as good’ should be interpreted to mean ‘enough so that everyone else can acquire an equally good share of unowned worldly resources’ (p. 123). A key, softly voiced notion here is that the proviso does not require that all persons have equal access to or possession of every kind of resource. If you and I share a state of nature in which I claim ownership of all ten apple trees and you claim ownership of all ten orange trees, it can easily be argued that our holdings are on a par, even though you hold no apples and I hold no oranges. Our holdings are equally good in the relevant general senses.

In Morgan’s case, it is not immediately clear whether hoarding the fish violates the proviso. Supposing Morgan’s fellow campers have access to enough other resources that are as good in the relevant senses (e.g., their degree of nourishment or potential as a source of industry) as if they had access to the pond, it may not. If that is the case, if the others are sufficiently well-equipped with effectively similar resources, then my instinctive unease with Morgan’s behavior turns to indifference. However, as soon as those resources no longer suffice for some reason—perhaps the campers consume them all or a frost kills off that which was available for foraging—Morgan’s claimed exclusive rights to the fishpond appear to violate the proviso and my aversion to the claim returns. Any satisfaction of the proviso, if it exists, seems tenuous at best. Ultimately, since my distaste or indifference turns on whether the proviso is violated or met, that condition seems to be the best explanation for my reaction, not the purported injustice of inheritance.

III. Threshold of Equality versus Full-Blown Socialism (plus objections)

If the best explanation for my automatic rejection of Morgan’s behavior is that it appears to deprive the other campers in terms of the Lockean proviso, then Cohen’s appeal for a complete socialist reformation no longer necessarily follows as a solution. Instead, the solution can be found in the proviso itself: develop a system that ensures the campers all have access to a threshold of resources that are on a par so that no one camper’s holdings inhibit another camper from, in Dworkin’s words, possessing “the opportunity to develop and lead a life he can regard as valuable both to himself and to [his community]” (p. 211). On a camping trip, this threshold of resources might be constituted by holdings in nuts, berries, mushrooms, tubers, or small game. In a democratic capitalist society like the U.S., it might take the form of a universal basic income. As with Cohen’s argument, this solution does not place a ceiling on the degree to which any camper can develop their resources through labor or trade, only a threshold of resources below which they would not be allowed to fall. Unlike Cohen’s argument, it does not require developing and implementing an inconceivably complex system for the widescale leveling-off of material and congenital resources at birth or the contentious practice of fixing incomes across industries and career levels. Far from necessitating a transition to full-blown socialism, this solution fits neatly and justifiably within the capitalist economy of a democratic state.

An objector might reply that a redistributive practice such as universal basic income (UBI), perhaps funded by a progressive income tax, is not justifiable within a capitalist context and constitutes a bridge toward the very socialist economy that I argued could be avoided. I can see where the objector is coming from. It is reasonable to contend that the notion is at odds with some of the other pro-capitalist arguments that have cited the Lockean proviso. Perhaps most notably, Nozick (1974) used the proviso to support his argument that there is virtually no justification for a redistributive function within a state for any purpose other than funding protective services. For Nozick, as with Locke, if the terms of the proviso are met, then an individual’s otherwise just acquisition of property entitles them to the exclusive right to hold and dispose of that property, free from redistributive claims. However, as Fleischer and Hemel (2017) acknowledge, the proviso can reasonably be construed as performing the reverse function, compelling rather than precluding a limited redistributive tax for the purposes I have described—protecting rather than violating personal property rights—and all within a capitalist context.

Fleischer and Hemel (2017) argue that “providing a minimum safety net to some strengthens the private property rights of others” (p. 14). They reference Libertarian proponent Eric Mack’s illustration of the “fully prepared hiker on a well-planned excursion” who encounters an unexpected blizzard and deathly cold conditions (p. 14). To her providence, the hiker stumbles upon a locked, privately owned but currently unoccupied cabin. Fleischer, Hemel, and Mack contend that no one—even the strictest capitalist—would reasonably or morally contend that the hiker must suffer exposure and probable death at the doorstep of the cabin to uphold the principle of private property. Instead, they “must tolerate some violation of private property rights, at least in the extreme circumstances of the freezing hiker” (p. 14). With that said, it is worth now considering how many individuals are, at any given time, suffering extreme conditions akin to those of the hiker and how many violations of personal property rights the capitalist is morally obligated to permit by these terms. As Fleischer and Hemel conclude, “[property] owners have an incentive to limit the situations in which hikers ignore their rights” (p. 15). Moreover, a scheme like UBI helps justify property ownership by better ensuring that the Lockean proviso truly is met (Fleischer & Hemel, 2017).

Tying this back to a redistributive scheme like UBI, our camper Morgan can pre-empt justified incursions on his fishpond from starving campers by supporting and participating in a limited practice of progressively taxing and redistributing the campers’ resources such that everyone is guaranteed a minimum threshold of sustenance. When the other campers have enough to live on from their own holdings, no distribution is necessary, and the fish are all Morgan’s. When a frost hits and the foragers dip below the level of sustenance, the scheme kicks in and those with greater resources progressively contribute to their baseline nourishment. Far from necessitating Cohen’s unfathomably difficult shift to full-blown socialism, this much simpler solution fits and is justifiable within the current capitalist economy.

Finally, a brief note on the second arm of Cohen’s argument—that birthright inequality causes dysfunction of the principle of community. It might be objected that my solution does not address this second principle. I would argue that the same epistemic relief that vacated my disdain for Morgan’s claim and behavior—recognizing that all others are well sustained—also vacates the communal frustration that might be generated by that disdain. As Harry Frankfurt (1987) noted, “we tend to be quite unmoved, after all, by inequalities between the well-to-do and the rich; our awareness that the former are substantially worse off than the latter does not disturb us morally at all” (p. 32). In other words, communal frustration seems to grow not from the observance that some individuals have less, but that “those with less have too little” (Frankfurt, 1987, p. 32). The alternative solution I have suggested, a threshold such as UBI, directly targets that difference.

I have argued that Cohen’s solution to our instinctively adverse reaction to the camping example is unfounded because he misinterpreted the cause of that reaction. Instead of being premised on a sense of birthright injustice, it seems to be premised on a sense that the capitalists in question are violating the Lockean proviso. As such, establishing a threshold of equality through an economic scheme like UBI more simply and more directly addresses the source of our implicit aversion without requiring a total socialist economic overhaul. While some might argue that UBI is a distinctly socialist scheme, I have shown how even the staunchest of libertarian capitalists are justified in adopting it to help protect private property and justify property rights.

Cohen, G. A. (2009). Why not socialism? https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400830633

Dworkin, R. (1986). A matter of principle. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1pncpxk

Fleischer, M. P., & Hemel, D. J. (2017). Atlas Nods: The Libertarian case for a basic income. Social Science Research Network. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3056576

Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, state, and utopia. New York : Basic Books.

Penner, J. E., & Otsuka, M. (2018). Property theory: Legal and Political Perspectives. In Cambridge University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108500043

[1] Where beneficial to the flow of this paper, narrative references following an initial in-text citation will omit the publication year per section 8.16 of the APA 7^th Ed. Publication Manual.