Why You’ll Not Necessarily Regret Not Reading This

I disagree with Mark Schroeder’s (2019) claim that anticipated regret (AR) is only intelligible when motivated by our desire for narrative agency in major life choices. I will argue that AR can be rationally formed from past experiences and rationally employed in decision-making. By providing an intelligible example of AR in the absence of a threat to narrative agency, I will show that a threat to narrative agency is not a necessary condition of AR.

In section one, I will provide a brief background of Schroeder’s argument as it relates to my objection. In section two, I will form an example of AR that is rational, intelligible, and not developed in response to a threat to narrative agency. In section three, I will discuss how the example proves my claim. I will also address what appears to be question-begging in Schroeder’s argument. Finally, I will conclude that narrative agency is not a necessary condition of AR.

I: Background

Schroeder (2019) differentiates major life choices from less impactful choices. He identifies major life choices as moments when we have the most overt control over the narrative direction of our lives. For example, when deciding whether to attend med school or join the circus. These contrast with everyday choices about what’s for dinner or which candle to buy. Schroeder argues that if we perceive a particular choice in a major life decision as a threat to our narrative agency, the threat will motivate AR of the choice. He argues that while we may factor AR into any type of choice, those motivated by threats to narrative agency are the only rational, intelligible cases, implying a necessary condition (Schroeder, 2019).

II: A Rational, Intelligible, Low-Stakes Example

First, consider the following example of regret. You order a jacket on sale from a discount clothing website. You’ve never ordered from this type of website and decide to give it a try. In photos, the jacket looks fashionable and appears to be of high quality despite a remarkably reasonable price. When the jacket arrives, it barely resembles the photos online, and the material is noticeably low-quality. When you attempt to return it, you’re directed to fine print stating that items on sale are non-returnable. You experience a compound of emotions, including disappointment in the quality of your purchase and frustration with the merchant. These lead you to regret buying the jacket. In other words, given this new information, you now value another choice more than the one you made.

The example above can motivate a future experience of AR. For example, a month later, a friend shows you a pair of shoes on the same website. Like the jacket, the shoes are fashionable, appear to be of high quality, and are reasonably priced. However, you recall your regret from the last purchase. You anticipate that ordering the shoes will lead to a similar experience of regret, so you decide not to order them.

III: Discussion

Importantly, this example does not contain a threat to the agent’s narrative arc. And yet, contrary to Schroeder, I find this example of low-stakes AR both rational and intelligible. Dana Howard (2021) summarizes regret as evaluative, affective, and motivational. AR is a function of the motivational feature of regret. It causes the agent to “change [their] policy about how to act in similar situations in the future” (Howard, 2021). Far from being unintelligible, this example of AR is a plainly logical, practical consideration. Moreover, there are plenty of cases in which it would be irrational to make decisions without factoring in the results of similar past experiences. But without the threat to narrative agency, the necessary condition Schroeder proposes does not exist.

I want to briefly address Schroeder’s (2019) criterion that we should only be considering major life choices. He might well respond that the above example is irrelevant as it only addresses mundane, everyday decisions. I chose that example because his criterion appears to be begging the question. If all major life choices are opportunities to change the course of our narrative arc, then any AR over such a choice will correlate with a threat to that narrative arc. As it turns out, AR can be rational and intelligible despite not involving a major life decision. In a longer paper, I would attempt to show an example of a threat to narrative agency existing in the absence of AR. That would indicate that these threats are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for AR.

Schroeder’s (2019) claim, as outlined in the opening of this paper, implies that a threat to narrative agency is a necessary condition for intelligible, rational cases of AR. By depicting an intelligible, rational case of AR in the absence of a threat to narrative agency, I have shown that Schroeder’s argument fails to satisfy a necessary condition. A necessary condition for AR would need to be associated with all instances of AR. This paper does not prove that there is no correlation whatsoever between narrative agency and AR. Further study is warranted to understand better any interplay between the two.